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Summary: The paper explores (former) transition economies, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and the Republic of Serbia, concerning abandonment of the exchange rate tar-
geting and fixed exchange rate regimes and movement toward explicit/implicit inflation 
targeting and flexible exchange rate regimes. The paper identifies different subperiods 
concerning crucial monetary and exchange rate regimes, and tracks the changes of spe-
cific monetary transmission channels i.e exchange rate channel, interest rate channel, 
indirect and direct influences to the exchange rate, with variance decomposition of 
VAR/VEC model. The empirical results indicate that Polish monetary strategy toward 
higher monetary and exchange rate flexibility has been performed smoothly, gradually 
and planned, compared to the Slovak and, especially, Czech case. The comparison of 
three former transition economies with the Serbian case indicate strong and persistent 
exchange rate pass-through, low interest rate pass-through, significant indirect and direct 
influence to the exchange rate as potential obstacles for successful inflation targeting in 
the Republic of Serbia.   
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Introduction 
 
Former transition economies, now members of the European Union (EU hereaf-
ter), used different exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks in 
the transition process, on the road to the EU membership (for an overview on 
exchange rate regimes choice in emerging countries, see Jean-Pierre Allegret, 
2007; and Kosta Josifidis, Jean-Pierre Allegret, and Emilija Beker, 2009). How-
ever, most countries at the beginning of the transition process used an exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor policy. The reason for almost uniform acceptance of 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor is well known. An exchange rate is a natural 
anchor in transition economies having in mind (hyper)-inflationary past. 
After this initial stabilization phase, at least three groups of countries 
can be distinguished. The first group – comprising Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia 
– refers to countries that kept rigid exchange rate form and thus exchange rate 
targeting. Estonia and Lithuania chose currency board and exchange rate target-
ing monetary regime in June 1992 and March 1994, respectively. Latvia adopted 
a conventional fixed peg in February 1994. All these countries are currently par-
ticipating in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) without changing their 
initial exchange rate regime, except Latvia that moved from conventional fixed 
peg to a basket to conventional fixed peg to a single currency in January 2005. 
The second group of countries – including Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania – 
followed no specific way, staying on the rigid exchange rate form or performing 
more flexible regimes with different nominal anchors. Slovenia used different de 
jure1 regimes alternating more or less rigid ones until its entry into the EU. After 
entry, Slovenia used intermediate exchange rate regime, namely the target zone 
of ERM II and in the end, joined the monetary union in January 2007. In the af-
termath of the failure of pegging in January 1991, Bulgaria chose an independ-
ently floating regime. Under the pressure of a currency crisis in July 1997, due 
to a dramatic increase in inflation, Bulgaria changed direction toward hard peg 
by adopting a currency board. Exchange rate regime in Romania followed dif-
ferent forms of intermediate regimes but has converged toward managed floating 
regime since November 2004. A common feature for Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania is the absence of explicit monetary strategy with the single anchor, like 
exchange rate targeting or inflation targeting.  
                                                 
1 Officially declared, i.e., de jure, exchange rate regimes could be different from de facto applied 
exchange rate regimes. IMF’s classifications are related with de jure or officially reported ex-
change rate regimes. However, observing the volatility of time series of nominal exchange rates, 
foreign exchange reserves and interest rates, distinction between de jure and de facto regimes 
could be identified. Thus, ‘fear of floating’ is evident in the situation when nominal exchange rate 
variability is low while foreign exchange reserves variability (direct influence to the exchange 
rate) and interest rate variability (indirect influence to the exchange rate) are high. For more details 
concerning the distinction between de jure and de facto exchange rate policies see Eduardo Levy-
Yeyati and Federico Sturzenegger (2002) and Guillermo A. Calvo and Carmen M. Reinhart 
(2002). 
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The last group of former transition economies that changed monetary 
and exchange rate regimes during the transition process consists of Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. All these countries first used exchange 
rate as a nominal anchor and then switched to a more flexible (some kind of in-
termediate form) exchange rate regime. Finally, they accepted free/managed 
floating exchange rate regimes and explicit/implicit inflation targeting frame-
work. Slovakia is now member of the European Monetary Union (EMU) after 
participation in ERM II, while Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary still do 
not participate in ERM II.  
This paper focuses on this last group. It investigates the road toward 
managed/free floating exchange rate regimes and explicit/implicit inflation tar-
geting framework by identifying changes in monetary transmission channels 
between different monetary and exchange rate regimes2. To this end, we use 
variance decompositions analysis in the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and the Republic of Serbia. Indeed, this latter country also abandoned 
exchange rate targeting, then accepted intermediate exchange rate regime and, 
finally, managed floating in the combination with (the preparation for an ex-
plicit) inflation targeting. Hence, it seems interesting to compare the experiences 
of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia with the Serbian case concerning 
the changes of nominal anchors and exchange rate regimes. 
Section 1 reviews the main changes in monetary and exchange rate re-
gimes for the studied countries. Section 2 introduces our empirical methodology 
and analyses the main results. Section 3 concludes. 
 
 
1. An Overview of Countries Experiences 
 
In this section, we review the experience of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia and the Republic of Serbia, respectively. We focus on main changes con-
cerning the choices of monetary and exchange rate regimes. The main purpose 
of this section is to identify different time periods corresponding to different 
combinations of monetary and exchange rate regimes. 
 
Poland 
Transition reforms in Poland started in January 1990 with the adoption of fixed 
exchange rate and then a monetary strategy based on exchange rate targeting. 
This monetary regime was one of the main foundations of the economic strategy 
                                                 
2 In this paper, exit strategies – e.g., transition from fixed or intermediate exchange rate regimes 
toward floating ones – are not analysed. On this point, see Barry Eichengreen, Paul Masson, Mi-
guel Savastano, and Shunil Sharma (1999); Pierre-Richard Agénor (2004); Atil Ahmet Asici, Na-
dezhda Ivanova, and Charles Wyplosz (2005); Josifidis, Allegret, and Beker (2009). 
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in the phase of macroeconomic stabilization. The Polish currency, the zloty, was 
initially tied to the American dollar. In the aftermath of the May 1991 devalua-
tion, the exchange rate regime moved from dollar pegging to a basket. In Octo-
ber 1991, Poland used more flexible exchange rate form (compared to the previ-
ous conventional fixed parity), concretely forward looking crawling basket peg. 
Such a regime was used since October 1991 until May 1995 while the rate of 
crawl was decreased from 1.8% to 1.2%. From May 1995 to April 2000, Poland 
adopted a crawling corridor or target zone with fluctuation margins of +/-7%. This 
exchange rate arrangement constitutes a new step toward higher exchange rate 
flexibility. After this date, Poland finally accepted a flexible exchange rate regime. 
However, in the period of the crawling corridor, very frequent changes of the cor-
ridor’s characteristics existed, above all, gradual widening of fluctuation margins 
(in February 1998 – +/-10%, in October 1998 – +/-12.5%, and in March 1999 – 
+/-15%) and decreasing of monthly crawl rate (from 1.2% in February 1995 to 
0.3% in March 1999). Poland has not yet participated in the ERM II. Thus, actual 
regimes are still free exchange rate floating and inflation targeting.  
The direction of monetary and exchange rate policy toward full flexibil-
ity and higher autonomy in the period 1990-2000 is obvious. Changes of mone-
tary and exchange rate policy have been conducted gradually from exchange rate 
to inflation targeting and from conventional fixed parity to a free floating ex-
change rate regime. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 
2009a), the monetary regime of exchange rate targeting (i.e., exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor policy) includes several exchange rate regimes, namely rigid 
exchange rate regimes, conventional fixed parity, adjustable and crawling pegs. 
Hence, in the case of Poland the period of exchange rate targeting was January 
1990 – May 1995. The period of crawling band or corridor (i.e., intermediate 
exchange rate regime) with widening fluctuation margins was May 1995 – April 
2000. The latter period does not imply explicit monetary strategy, but some kind 
of transitional monetary strategy toward explicit, direct, full-fledged inflation 
targeting. And finally, the period after April 2000 assumes new monetary strat-
egy: an inflation targeting monetary framework. Gradual transition toward 
higher exchange rate flexibility has been shown as a correct strategy concerning 
achieved and maintained macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic stability was 
primarily achieved due to exchange rate as a nominal anchor policy, but it has 
been kept due to changed monetary strategy with more discretion and autonomy.  
In order to investigate monetary transmission channels within specific 
monetary and exchange rate arrangements, and in order to avoid structural 
breaks especially emphasized in time series of transition countries, our overview 
of Polish experience leads us to distinguish the following subperiods: 
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! the first subperiod, 1990:01-1995:05, the period of exchange rate as a 
nominal anchor (monetary regime), conventional fixed parity and crawl-
ing peg with decreasing rate of crawl (exchange rate regimes); 
! the second subperiod, 1995:05-2000:04, transitional monetary strategy 
toward inflation targeting (monetary regime), crawling corridor regime 
with widening fluctuation margins and decreasing rate of crawl (ex-
change rate regime); 
! the third subperiod, 2000:04-2009:01, period of explicit inflation target-
ing (monetary regime) and free exchange rate floating (exchange rate 
regime). 
 
Czech Republic 
Czechoslovakia started with transition reforms in January 1990, choosing a con-
ventional fixed exchange rate with narrow fluctuation margins +/-0.5% regard-
ing the basket peg (including the currencies of key trading partners – Germany, 
the United States, Austria, Switzerland and the United Kingdom). In January 
1993, Czechoslovakia was divided into the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and 
monetary union between them disappeared. Hence, empirical research of ex-
change rate and monetary regime changes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
starts with January 1993.  
In May 1993, monetary authorities of the Czech Republic decided to re-
structure the currency basket and confined it to the German mark with 65% ratio 
and the American dollar with 35% ratio. There were no crucial changes until 
February 1996 when the Czech Republic switched it’s exchange rate regime 
from conventional fixed to intermediate regime in the form of the corridor with 
+/-7% fluctuation margins. At the same time, exchange rate targeting was aban-
doned and accepted the combination between exchange rate and monetary tar-
geting (M2 monetary aggregate). However, in May 1997, under speculative at-
tacks, the Czech koruna significantly depreciated, along with other crisis indica-
tors, and monetary authorities were forced to leave intermediate exchange rate 
regime and accept managed floating. 
A new monetary strategy of inflation targeting, compatible with more 
flexible exchange rate regime, was officially accepted in December 1997. On the 
base of described changes of monetary and exchange rate regimes in the Czech 
Republic, key subperiods for empirical investigation are identified: 
! the first subperiod, 1993:01-1996:02, exchange rate targeting (monetary 
regime) and conventional fixed parity (exchange rate regime); 
! the second subperiod, 1996:02-1997:12, transitional monetary strategy 
toward inflation targeting (monetary regime) and intermediate exchange 
rate regime in the form of a corridor (exchange rate regime); 
! the third subperiod, 1997:12-2009:01, inflation targeting monetary re-
gime (since December 1997) and managed floating exchange rate re-
gime (since May 1997). 
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The third subperiod is quite long (1997:12-2009:01) and within the sub-
period, nominal exchange rate depreciation and appreciation tendencies are 
clearly observable. Hence, for the third subperiod, variance decomposition is 
derived for the first part of the third subperiod 1997:12-2001:01 (nominal ex-
change rate depreciation tendency) and the second one 2001:01-2009:01 (nomi-
nal exchange rate appreciation tendency). If these results are significantly differ-
ent from the whole third subperiod, they are presented separately within empiri-
cal results. 
 
Slovakia 
Empirical research related to changes of nominal anchors and exchange rate re-
gimes in Slovakia starts with January 1993, having in mind already mentioned 
division of the monetary union between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The 
former Czechoslovakia used fixed exchange rate tied to basket currencies with 
narrow fluctuation margins +/-0.5% around the central parity. Slovakia, like the 
Czech Republic, continued with exchange rate targeting in order to achieve mac-
roeconomic stability. The exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor for four 
years. Changes were related only to the basket restructuring in January 1994 
(60% German mark and the remaining 40% American dollar), and the widening 
of fluctuation margins to 1.5%. After the period of exchange rate targeting, a 
new intermediate exchange rate regime in the form of the corridor with fluctua-
tion margins +/-7% had been adopted in January 1997. 
From a de jure perspective, there was no explicit anchor for monetary 
policy in Slovakia since 1997, but from a de facto viewpoint, monetary regime 
could be considered implicit inflation targeting (Mathias Nell, 2004). The ex-
change rate regime was changed into managed floating in October 1998. Man-
aged floating was the third exchange rate regime since the beginning of the tran-
sition and at the same time, the third subperiod for our empirical research. In 
contrast to Poland and the Czech Republic, Slovakia is a member of the euro-
zone and previously participated in ERM II. Hence, after managed floating, the 
exchange rate regime was again moved toward intermediate option of the target 
zone with +/-15% fluctuation margins in November 2005. The last change as-
sumed monetary non-autonomy and rigid exchange rate regime with joining the 
EMU in January 2009.  
According to mentioned monetary and exchange rate regime changes in 
Slovakia since the beginning of the transition until today, the following subpe-
riods have been identified: 
! the first subperiod, 1993:01-1997:01, exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
policy (monetary regime) and conventional fixed parity (exchange rate 
regime); 
! the second subperiod, 1997:01-1998:10, no explicit monetary strategy 
(implicit inflation targeting) and intermediate exchange rate regime in 
the form of the corridor (exchange rate regime); 
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! the third subperiod, 1998:10-2005:11, no explicit monetary strategy 
(implicit inflation targeting) and managed floating regime (exchange 
rate regime); 
! the fourth subperiod, 2005:11-2009:01, no explicit monetary strategy 
(implicit inflation targeting) and intermediate regime of the corridor or 
target zone – ERM II; 
! the fifth subperiod, 2009:01-_, membership in the EMU (monetary non-
autonomy) and rigid exchange rate regime. 
 
Republic of Serbia 
At the beginning of the transition process, from October 2000, Serbia used the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor in order to achieve macrostability. Namely, a 
conventional fixed peg was used from October 2000 until January 2003. Since 
January 2003, the nominal dinar exchange rate started to depreciate and was 
accompanied with rising inflation. The period January 2003 – September 2006 
was marked with significant exchange rate depreciation within intermediate ex-
change rate regime, namely crawling peg. However, exchange rate as a nominal 
anchor created distortions concerning internal and external balance (Emilija 
Beker, 2007; Kosta Josifidis and Emilija Beker, 2007). Inflation inertia com-
bined with an exchange rate peg resulted in real exchange rate appreciation with 
negative consequences on external balance in the form of rising current account 
deficit. Due to rising negative pressures from internal and external aspects, 
monetary authorities in Serbia decided to change monetary and exchange rate 
strategy and accept inflation targeting combined with a managed floating ex-
change rate regime. Having in mind that exchange rate targeting includes ex-
change rate regimes from the rigid form to the crawling peg, Serbia officially 
abandoned the exchange rate as a nominal anchor in September 2006 when Na-
tional Bank of Serbia (NBS, 2008a) announced the preparation for full-fledged 
inflation targeting.  
The period since September 2006 until now presents the third important 
subperiod in research of monetary strategy changes in the transition process. Ac-
cording to the mentioned changes, three subperiods are identified in the case of 
Serbia: 
! the first subperiod, 2001:01-2003:01, exchange rate targeting (monetary 
regime) and conventional fixed parity (exchange rate regime); 
! the second subperiod, 2003:01-2006:09, mixed monetary strategy3 and 
intermediate exchange rate regime in the form of the crawling peg (ex-
change rate regime); 
                                                 
3 According to the IMF’s classification of exchange rate regimes and monetary policy frameworks, 
in 2003 and 2004, Serbia used an ‘other’ monetary program, while in December 2005, the Serbian 
monetary program is regarded as monetary targeting. Hence, in this empirical investigation, the 
subperiod between exchange rate targeting and inflation targeting is instead called ‘mixed mone-
tary strategy’.    
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! the third subperiod, 2006:09-2009:01, preparation for direct inflation 
targeting framework (monetary regime) and managed floating exchange 
rate regime.  
2. Changes of Nominal Anchors and Monetary Transmission Channels: A 
VAR-VEC Approach 
 
Our first step introduces our empirical methodology and literature review. Our 
second step analyses the main empirical results for each country while the third 
step analyses them by comparing our four studied countries. 
 
Methodology and Literature Review 
 
Changes concerning monetary transmission channels in different monetary and 
exchange rate regimes in the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Serbia are investigated with variance decomposition of structural Vector Auto-
regression (VAR) and Vector Error Correction (VEC) models. Monthly time 
series are obtained from IMF database (International Financial Statistics)4 and 
websites of central banks for the period 1990:01-2009:01. 
Following time series are used in the model: consumer price index, CPI 
(base year 2000); nominal effective exchange rate, NEER (base year 2000); 
nominal exchange rate, NER (only in the case of Serbia, dinar per euro); refi-
nancing rate, REFR (before the announcement of the reference repo rate in the 
case of Poland5); reference repo rate, IRR (with the adoption of inflation target-
ing regime in the case of Poland); discount rate, DR (only available interest rate 
set by the central bank6 until inflation targeting adoption in the case of the Czech 
Republic); repo rate, RR (since the adoption of inflation targeting in the Czech 
case); discount rate, IR (in the case of Slovakia); and foreign exchange reserves, 
FE. Before unit root testing, time series are transformed to logarithms and sea-
sonally adjusted. 
After data transformations, an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is 
conducted in the level and the first differences. Constant and trend are included 
as deterministic variables in the level of time series, constant in the first differ-
ences, and lags are determined according to common information criteria. If time 
series are I(1), i.e., integrated of order one, Johansen’s cointegration method is 
applied to decide whether they are cointegrated. If non-stationary time series 
                                                 
4 International Monetary Fund. 2009b. International Financial Statistics. 
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf (accessed January 3, 2009). 
5 Refinancing rate is used as a proxy for the interest bank set by the central bank of Poland. It is 
used until the announcement of the repo rate, key in the period of inflation targeting. Both time 
series are taken from IMF database, International Financial Statistics. 
6 Discount rate is used for the first and the second subperiod in the case of the Czech Republic 
until the inflation targeting adoption. Since then, repo rate time series have been announced and 
they are used in the model for the third subperiod. 
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form a long run relation, i.e., they are cointegrated, the VEC model is estimated 
and variance decomposition is derived from the model. If time series are not sta-
tionary, they are included in the VAR model, because variance decomposition 
and impulse responses assume stationarity of the whole system. A combination 
of stationary and non-stationary time series are also included in the VAR model, 
but non-stationary series have to be differenced in order to attain stationarity. 
Variance decomposition is derived from estimated VAR or VEC model with 
different variable ordering, impulse and responses, depending from the exam-
ined transmission channel. The dynamic influence of different shocks is ob-
served within the period of 24 months. 
As Poland, the Czech Republic, and Serbia have yet to participate in 
ERM II – and thus have not switched from free/managed floating to the target 
zone of ERM II – the fourth and the fifth subperiods in the case of Slovakia will 
not be investigated. The empirical research refers to the monetary path from ex-
change rate targeting to inflation targeting and the exchange rate path from con-
ventional fixed parity to managed/free floating. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002), and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) 
used time series of foreign exchange reserves, interest rates as well as nominal 
exchange rates to identify the difference between de jure and de facto exchange 
rate regimes. The situation of de jure floating exchange rate, but with significant 
variations of foreign exchange reserves and interest rate to mitigate exchange 
rate fluctuations, indicates a ‘fear of floating’ problem.  
Soyoung Kim (2003) uses SVAR model in order to identify two types of 
influences (shocks) to exchange rate: the influence of conventional monetary 
policy (via interest rate) and foreign exchange interventions (via foreign ex-
change reserves) in the case of the United States in the post Bretton Woods era. 
The author comes to three key findings: first, the shocks of foreign exchange 
interventions (above all, net purchase of foreign currency) have stronger influ-
ence on exchange rate fluctuations (appreciations) compared to shocks of con-
ventional monetary policy of the Federal Reserve; second, the Federal Reserve 
more often used foreign exchange interventions in order to stabilize the ex-
change rate compared to interest rate policy, namely sterilized intervention 
within one month; and third, conventional monetary policy through an interest 
rate instrument has also had significant influence on the exchange rate although 
to a lesser extent than foreign exchange intervention.  
Reginaldo Pinto Nogueira (2006) investigates exchange rate pass-
through with the SVAR model on the example of developed and emerging 
economies before and after the adoption of the inflation targeting framework. 
SVAR model – i.e., variance decomposition and impulse responses – is used in 
the research of the strength and dynamics of inflation, interest rate and foreign 
exchange reserves reactions to exchange rate changes. The author confirms 
stronger exchange rate pass-through to prices in the case of emerging compared 
to developed economies. Exchange rate pass-through and foreign exchange rate 
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interventions have weakened after inflation targeting adoption in all investigated 
economies.  
Javier A. Reyes (2003) does not agree with the findings of empirical re-
search concerning the decreasing exchange rate pass-through after the inflation 
targeting adoption. The reasons for exchange rate pass-through weakening have 
been explained with credibility growth of monetary authorities in emerging 
economies, low inflationary environment and/or negative output gaps. However, 
the main point, as Reyes argues, is the fact that monetary authorities strongly in-
tervene in foreign exchange markets to directly limit exchange rate fluctuations, 
and in that way to hit the inflation target. The exchange rate pass-through is actu-
ally still significant – the reason for direct influence to exchange rate movements 
via foreign exchange interventions – but data point to transmission weakening be-
cause fluctuations are constrained in order to achieve the inflation target.  
Dejan Krusec (2005) analyses an adequacy of inflation targeting regime 
for Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary on the road to the EMU. 
The author explores the period since the inflation targeting adoption by examin-
ing following variables: three-month interest rates on money market (indicator 
for nominal interest rate of the central bank), inflation rate (first difference of 
consumer price index) and industrial production (logarithmic values of industrial 
production in the level). The mentioned variables are used in order to investigate 
the reaction of, above all, an inflation to the shock of restrictive monetary policy 
with impulse responses in VAR model. In all cases, restrictive monetary policy 
relatively quickly reduces inflation rate which returns to the zero value four to 
six months after the initial interest rate shock. A nominal interest rate increase of 
one percentage point (the impulse) induces an inflation rate fall from one half to 
one percentage point (the response) in all examined EU member countries. On 
the basis of empirical results, Krusec argues that inflation targeting is an accept-
able regime for former transition economies on the road to the EMU because 
Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian monetary authorities could successfully 
control and reduce inflation with restrictive policy due to a clear relationship of 
monetary instruments and the final goal.  
However, according to the authors’ acknowledgement, there has not 
been the empirical investigation of monetary transmission channels changes in 
transition economies concerning identified subperiods on the road from ex-
change rate as a nominal anchor toward inflation targeting (with compatible 
changes of exchange rate regimes, from fixed regime, through intermediate, and 
finally managed/free floating regime) which at the same time comprise several 
transmission channels with identification of (in)direct influence to the exchange 
rate. The paper empirically investigates the changes within monetary transmis-
sion channels on the road toward higher monetary and exchange rate flexibility 
in (former) transition economies which have chosen the mentioned path in the 
transition process. Hence, the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
and the Republic of Serbia are focused on. Empirical research is based on inves-
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tigation of: exchange rate tranmission to consumer price level (exchange rate 
channel), comparison of strength and dynamic of exchange rate and interest rate 
pass-through to consumer price level (comparison of exchange rate and interest 
rate channel), indirect influence to the exchange rate via interest rate policy and 
direct influence to the exchange rate via foreign exchange inerventions. 
 
Results  
 
Tables 1 to 4 in the Appendix show exchange rate transmission, interest rate 
transmission, indirect and direct influence to the exchange rate within identified 
subperiods of exchange rate targeting, intermediate exchange regimes and infla-
tion targeting in the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Re-
public of Serbia, successively. 
Poland  
The empirical results concerning the exchange rate and interest rate pass-
through, (in)direct influence to the exchange rate in the case of Poland, are pre-
sented with Table 1 in the Appendix.  
See Table 1 in the Appendix 
Exchange rate pass-through to the price level (the so-called exchange rate 
channel) is identified with the variance decomposition of consumer price index as 
a response to nominal exchange rate shock. Exchange rate pass-through is not sig-
nificant in the case of Poland in all studied subperiods. In the period under ex-
change rate targeting, nominal exchange rate shock explains only 0.67% variation 
of the price level. The impact of nominal exchange rate shock is not significantly 
higher in the second and third subperiods when exchange rate regime has moved 
toward higher flexibility while monetary strategy changed toward an inflation tar-
geting framework. When we compare the respective influence of nominal ex-
change rate and interest rate shocks, exchange rate pass-through remains insignifi-
cant in all exchange rate regimes and both monetary strategies. This relatively low 
impact of nominal exchange rate changes to consumer prices is a favorable pre-
condition for successful inflation targeting because low pass-through reduces the 
necessity to limit exchange rate fluctuations. As a result, the central bank can use 
its interest rates to achieve its inflation target. 
Low exchange rate pass-through is connected with the openness of the 
Polish economy. According to the data of the World Bank Group (2008)7, Po-
land is a relatively large and closed economy with relatively low ratio of ex-
port/import activities to Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Compared to the Czech 
                                                 
7 World Bank Group. 2008. Quick Query selected from World Development Indicators. 
http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers (accessed December, 
2008). 
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Republic, Slovakia and the Republic of Serbia, Poland has the smallest ratio of 
foreign trade to GDP. Hence it is a relatively closed economy with limited im-
pact of exchange rate pass-through. In addition, in line with IIan Goldfajn and 
Sergio R. da C. Werlang (2002), who consider the potential determinants of the 
pass-through, it is interesting to stress that over the 1994-2008 period, Poland 
recorded the best inflation performance – such a credibility effect decreases the 
degree of pass-through – and at the same time, the lower growth one, reducing 
the ability of firms to transmit exchange rate swings to their prices. 
As exchange rate pass-through is not strong in the case of Poland, a 
weighted implication is that the interest rate should not react significantly to ex-
change rate shocks. Our results confirm this implication: exchange rate shock 
explains less than 1% of interest rate variations in the first and second subpe-
riods. However, under inflation targeting monetary regime and free exchange 
rate floating, exchange rate shock explains somewhat higher (but still not sig-
nificant) variations of the repo interest rate, 8.33% after two years. 
Variations of foreign exchange reserves are the main instrument used by 
the authorities when the exchange rate is the nominal anchor of the monetary 
policy. In this sense, foreign exchange reserves exert a direct influence on the 
exchange rate. As results show, in the period of exchange rate targeting, the im-
pact of nominal exchange rate shock rises, thus explaining 7.4% of foreign ex-
change reserves variations after 24 months. This result is consistent with the 
previous argument. The results of direct influence on exchange rate fluctuations 
in the periods of intermediate and free floating exchange rate regimes point to 
the distinction between de jure and de facto chosen exchange rate regimes. 
However, in the case of Poland, such distinction does not matter since the varia-
tions of foreign exchange reserves are not predominantly explained by nominal 
exchange rate shocks: 0.78% in the second and 1.45% in the third subperiods 
after 24 months.  
Overall, results of variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model exhibit 
pretty low exchange rate pass-through in the case of Poland. Hence exchange 
rate movements explain only a small part of interest rate changes. As expected, 
we show that foreign exchange reserves are used more to defend parity in the 
period of exchange rate targeting, while in the period of higher exchange rate 
flexibility, foreign exchange interventions are not significant. Finally, in the pe-
riod of free exchange rate movements and inflation targeting, there are no impor-
tant interventions pointing to the fact that de jure are at the same time de facto 
regimes. 
 
Czech Republic 
The exchange rate and interest rate pass-through to consumer prices, like indi-
rect and direct influences to exchange rate fluctuations via interest rate and for-
eign exchange reserves, in the case of the Czech Republic are presented with 
Table 2.  
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See Table 2 in the Appendix 
 
Exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices is strong in the case of 
the Czech Republic. As results suggest when exchange rate is a nominal anchor, 
nominal exchange rate shock causes 11.52% of variation in the consumer price 
level. Pass-through is the weakest in the period of managed floating regime and 
inflation targeting framework: exchange rate shock explains only 5.28% of price 
level changes after 24 months. Interestingly, if we separate this last subperiod by 
considering the depreciation period (until 2001) and the appreciation one (since 
2001), then results of exchange rate pass-through are different. Namely, the ex-
change rate shock explains even 66% of variation in the consumer price level 
after 24 months in the period of significant nominal exchange rate depreciation. 
The results indicate that exchange rate pass-through is much stronger when de-
preciation pressures are intense. Likewise, very strong and increasing influence 
of the exchange rate shock to consumer price level is obvious in the second sub-
period (exchange rate shock explains 60% of price variations after 12 months) 
when the Czech Republic left exchange rate as a nominal anchor and switched to 
intermediate (corridor) regime. This period involves the currency crisis in May 
1997 that was accompanied with strong exchange rate depreciation. 
By comparing exchange rate and interest rate pass-through to consumer 
prices, the influence of the exchange rate shock is fairly moderate in the first and 
third subperiod, explaining 3.68% and 0.54% of price variations after 24 months, 
respectively. But in the second subperiod the influence of the exchange rate 
shock has grown rapidly and significantly, thus explaining 0.88% of price varia-
tion in the first month and even 76% in the second month. However, the depre-
ciation period shows that exchange rate pass-through is higher relative to the 
whole third subperiod (the exchange rate shock explains 20% of price variation 
after one year in the depreciation period and for the whole third subperiod, only 
0.15% of price variation). The impact of the interest rate shock is moderate, but 
we observe a rising trend. More precisely, the highest impact corresponds to the 
inflation targeting subperiod: the shock explains 23.61% of consumer price 
changes. The strengthening of interest rate influence is a good sign for inflation 
targeting framework because the central bank should primarily use the repo in-
terest rate (i.e., interest rate channel) to achieve its final target. 
Nominal exchange rate shock causes 15.16% of interest rate variation in 
the period of exchange rate targeting, 60.77% in the period of intermediate ex-
change rate regime and 12.74% in the period of managed floating/inflation tar-
geting, 24 months after the initial shock. Interest rate changes are dominantly 
explained by the nominal exchange rate shock in the second subperiod when 
exchange rate pass-through was the highest. Of course, in more flexible regimes 
indirect influence on the exchange rate via interest rate is more appropriate than 
direct interventions via foreign exchange reserves. Observing the results of di-
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rect influence on the exchange rate, the foreign exchange interventions appear 
quite moderate in the first and second subperiods and somewhat higher in the 
period of inflation targeting (the exchange rate shock explains 7.17% of foreign 
exchange variations in the first month, while the influence of the shock increases 
to 36.35% after 24 months). Increasing and relatively higher direct influence on 
exchange rate fluctuations in the period of managed floating/inflation targeting 
leads to the conclusion that Czech monetary authorities use more foreign ex-
change interventions to manage exchange rate movements than repo interest 
rate.  
 
Slovakia 
The results of variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model in the case of Slova-
kia are presented with Table 3. 
 
See Table 3 in the Appendix 
 
The exchange rate pass-through in Slovakia has not passed 13% (per-
centage explaining consumer price variations) in all investigated subperiods. 
When we compare the influence of exchange rate and interest rate shocks to 
consumer price level, we see that the exchange rate pass-through is stronger than 
interest rate pass-through. In the first subperiod – where the exchange rate is a 
nominal anchor – the interest rate shock explains 6.84% of price variation, while 
the exchange rate shock explains 35.06% of price variation after 24 months. The 
dominance of exchange rate shocks over interest rate shocks in the transmission 
to the price level is the strongest in the period of intermediate exchange rate re-
gime. During this period, the nominal exchange rate depreciates as in the case of 
the Czech Republic. In that period, the exchange rate shock explains 96.98% of 
price variation compared to the influence of the interest rate shock – 0.01% of 
price variation. 
High exchange rate pass-through is found in the circumstances of sig-
nificant nominal depreciation. Hence, the highest indirect and direct influence on 
the exchange rate is observed in the period of intermediate exchange rate regime 
characterized with nominal exchange rate depreciation. The interest rate is sig-
nificantly used (97% of interest rate variation is explained by nominal exchange 
rate shock two years after the initial shock) to influence exchange fluctuations in 
the subperiod of intermediate exchange rate regime and to a lesser extent, for-
eign exchange reserves (31.8% of foreign exchange variation are explained by 
nominal exchange rate shock two years after the initial shock). In the third sub-
period of implicit inflation targeting/managed floating exchange rate regime, the 
exchange rate pass-through weakens, decreasing the necessity to limit exchange 
rate fluctuations. The exchange rate shock explains 3.61% of interest rate varia-
tion, while the same shock explains only 0.8% of foreign exchange rate varia-
tion. These results indicate weak managing of the exchange rate fluctuations 
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with more indirect interest rate influence (that is in line with the inflation target-
ing framework) and the consistency between de jure and de facto applied ex-
change rate policy. 
Republic of Serbia  
The results of the variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model for the Republic 
of Serbia are presented with Table 4. 
 
See Table 4 in the Appendix 
 
Exchange rate pass-through in Serbia is significant and persistent in all 
subperiods. When exchange rate was the nominal anchor in the conduct of 
monetary policy, the exchange rate shock explained 35% of price variation after 
24 months, in the subperiod of intermediate regime 33.94% and 40.47% in the 
subperiod of managed floating in combination with the preparation for explicit 
inflation targeting, respectively. These results indicate that exchange rate is the 
common nominal anchor in the Serbian economy because exchange rate pass-
through is quite resistent regardless of different de jure monetary and exchange 
rate regimes. 
The relative ratio of exchange rate and interest rate shocks explaining 
price level variations shows that the percentage of the exchange rate shock is 
much higher in all subperiods. Within an exchange rate targeting monetary 
framework, the exchange rate shock explains 31.66% of price variation after 24 
months, while the interest rate shock explains only 2.73%. Within intermediate 
exchange rate regime, the exchange rate shock explains 35% (compared to 
3.44% due to the interest rate shock) of consumer price changes after two years. 
Finally, with the acceptance of managed floating regime, exchange rate pass-
through is still strong, explaining 55% of price variation after 24 months, com-
pared to 2.73% of price variation explained by the interest rate shock.  
As the exchange rate pass-through appears significant and persistent in 
the case of Serbia, limiting exchange rate fluctuations in the second and the third 
subperiods stays important for the authorities. The indirect influence on the ex-
change rate has been increased in the period of managed floating. Although the 
influence of the repo interest rate has been strengthened in the third subperiod, 
direct influence with foreign exchange reserves is still the strongest channel to 
limit exchange rate fluctuations. According to the results of the third subperiod, 
nominal exchange rate shock induces 15.86% of variation of foreign exchange 
reserves in the first month, with rising influence to 81.92% after two years.  
In the case of Serbia, the dominant transmission channel is the exchange 
rate channel. However, an encouraging sign is the growing role of the interest 
rate for indirect managing of exchange rate fluctuations, although the dominant 
influence remains foreign exchange intervention. Strong exchange rate pass-
through, weak interest rate pass-through and dominant direct managing of the 
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exchange rate fluctuations, however, are not good prerequisites for successful 
managed floating and inflation targeting regimes. These findings are in line with 
our previous thought (Josidifis and Beker, 2008) that an inflation targeting 
framework will be confronted with serious obstacles concerning strong exchange 
rate pass-through, financial euroization and inconsistency between monetary and 
fiscal policy. These obstacles favor a fixed rather than flexible regime, as well as 
exchange rate targeting rather than inflation targeting. However, we also argue 
that with the entry to the EU, the transition toward the target zone ERM II will 
be more smooth, with less shocks concerning internal and external balance. 
Also, current monetary and exchange rate regimes offer monetary authorities in 
Serbia more discretionary space having in mind the decision whether to influ-
ence the exchange rate fluctuations and in what way – indirectly via interest rate 
or directly through foreign exchange interventions.  
 
Comparison of Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Republic of Serbia 
 
On the basis of the previous results of variance decomposition in VAR/VEC 
model, Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show a comparison of Polish, Czech, Slovak and 
Serbian cases regarding the changes of nominal anchors and exchange rate re-
gimes. Figure 1 presents the exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices in 
all subperiods in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Republic of Ser-
bia.  
 
See Figure 1 in the Appendix 
 
As we can see in the Figure, Serbia has the highest exchange rate pass-
through in the period when exchange rate is the nominal anchor (the first subpe-
riod) and in the period of managed floating (the third subperiod). The Czech Re-
public, in the period of disorderly exit from exchange rate as a nominal anchor 
policy (the second subperiod of intermediate exchange rate regime), has the 
highest exchange rate pass-through, then follows Serbia, Slovakia and, with the 
lower exchange rate pass-through, Poland. Poland has experienced the lowest 
level of exchange rate pass-through and among other factors, that was the indica-
tor of successful, gradual and planned exit from one monetary strategy to an-
other.  
Figure 2 shows the results of interest rate pass-through to consumer 
prices in all subperiods.  
 
See Figure 2 in the Appendix 
 
Results are mixed. Poland exhibits the strongest interest rate transmis-
sion in the first subperiod, the Czech Republic in the second and third subpe-
riods. One positive sign of monetary anchor changes in the Czech Republic is 
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the growing impact of interest rate shocks and rising role of this key monetary 
instrument, especially in the period of inflation targeting. At the opposite, in the 
case of Serbia, the role of the interest rate concerning direct interest rate pass-
through to prices has not been increased during the transition toward flexible 
exchange rate and inflation targeting. In fact, the interest rate has been used 
more to influence the exchange rate as a crucial monetary channel. 
Figures 3 and 4 point to the indirect and direct influences on exchange 
rate fluctuations. While foreign exchange interventions are quite normal in order 
to defend the parity within the exchange rate targeting monetary framework, in 
the circumstances of floating exchange rate regimes, a favorable option is indi-
rect influence via the repo interest rate, although exchange rate managing is al-
lowed only in rare and ad hoc situations. Indirect influence on exchange rate 
movements, presented with Figure 3, is interesting since the adoption of more 
flexible exchange rate regimes because within fixed exchange rate arrangements 
there is no significant fluctuation (except maybe very narrow bands).  
 
See Figure 3 in the Appendix 
 
Hence, in the period of intermediate exchange rate regime, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic mostly used the interest rate to influence exchange rate fluc-
tuations, followed by Serbia and Poland. These results are in line with the find-
ing that within intermediate regime, exchange rate pass-through was very high in 
the Czech and Slovak cases; Poland had very low exchange rate pass-through 
with no significant need to influence the exchange rate; Serbia had very high 
exchange rate-pass through but not a strong interest rate channel in that period. 
Concerning the Serbian case, in the third subperiod, the impact of the repo rate 
to exchange rate fluctuation is stronger and compared to other cases, Serbia has 
shown the highest impact of repo interest rate to exchange rate changes – an en-
couraging sign for the new monetary framework.  
The direct impact on exchange rate fluctuation with foreign exchange 
reserves is presented with Figure 4.  
 
See Figure 4 in the Appendix 
 
In the period of exchange rate targeting, direct influence on exchange 
rate fluctuation was rising but moderate, as nominal exchange rate shock did not 
explain more than 10% of variation in foreign exchange reserves. Higher direct 
influence was in the second subperiod of intermediate exchange rate regimes, 
when Slovakia (after six months) and Serbia (after 24 months) had the highest 
levels. Obviously, as Serbia did not use indirect influence, it instead limited ex-
change rate fluctuations with foreign exchange reserves. The least direct influ-
ence shows in Poland, again in line with the fact that exchange rate pass-through 
was pretty low in the second subperiod as well. Within an inflation targeting 
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framework without preferable use of foreign exchange interventions, the Repub-
lic of Serbia has expressed the strongest and increasing role of foreign reserves, 
followed by the Czech Republic with much lower direct exchange rate influence. 
Slovakia has not significantly used foreign reserves, while Poland traditionally 
has not used direct, nor indirect, influences to limit exchange rate fluctuations. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The paper investigates the changes of nominal anchors and exchange rate re-
gimes in the cases of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Republic of 
Serbia. All these countries have moved toward more flexible exchange rate re-
gimes with finally the adoption of managed/free floating regimes and im-
plicit/explicit inflation targeting framework. According to the results presented 
in the paper, in the case of Poland changes of nominal anchors have been grad-
ual, planned and smooth. This country is characterized by a relatively low ex-
change rate pass-through, reducing the need to influence exchange rate fluctua-
tions either directly with foreign exchange reserves or indirectly via the interest 
rate. From this standpoint, the Polish strategy is regarded as the most successful, 
as the current free exchange rate floating/inflation targeting frameworks are the 
most convenient compared to other economies that followed the same exchange 
rate and monetary path. From the opposite side, changes of exchange rate re-
gimes toward higher flexibility in the Czech Republic have been accompanied 
with strong depreciation pressures while the exit strategy was marked as disor-
derly or crisis driven. On the basis of presented results, the Czech Republic ex-
pressed very strong exchange rate pass-through, especially in the period of 
nominal exchange rate depreciation. Accordingly, monetary authorities aim to 
limit exchange rate fluctuations directly and indirectly in all analysed exchange 
rate regimes and monetary frameworks. However, positive signs concerning in-
flation targeting are the growing interest rate pass-through and higher possibility 
to influence the final goal of monetary policy directly through the interest rate 
channel. Besides strengthening the interest rate channel, it seems that exchange 
rate pass-through has been weakened in the period of managed floating with 
relative fall of direct/indirect interventions. In the case of Slovakia, the success 
regarding the transition to more flexible monetary and exchange rate regimes is 
somewhere between the successful Polish case and the unsuccessful Czech case. 
Although Serbian authorities have abandoned exchange rate targeting in favor-
able circumstances (strong capital inflows with appreciation pressures), flexible 
exchange rate regime and inflation targeting will be confronted with some diffi-
culties. On the basis of our findings, exchange rate pass-through is significant 
(the highest compared to former transition economies); then, indirect and direct 
influences on exchange rate fluctuations stay important. The interest rate pass-
through to the final monetary goal is not strong enough, thus monetary policy 
via the repo interest rate indirectly influence the exchange rate and consequently, 
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the inflation target. Indirect and direct influences to exchange rate fluctuations 
are the highest compared to investigated former transition economies in the pe-
riod of inflation targeting. While indirect influence is permitted, as the exchange 
rate channel represents one of key monetary transmission channels, undesirable 
direct influence is still significant enough to indicate the difference between de 
jure and de facto applied exchange rate regimes. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1.  Monetary transmission channels in the first, second and third subpe-
riod in Poland according the results of variance decomposition of CPI, REFR/IR, 
FE to NEER and REFR/IR shocks within VAR/VEC model 
 
Notes: exchange rate channel"ordering NEER-CPI, responses of CPI; interest rate chan-
nel"ordering NEER-REFR/IRR-CPI, responses of CPI; indirect influence to 
NEER"NEER-CPI-REFR/IRR, responses of REFR/IRR; direct influence to 
NEER"NEER-FE, responses of FE. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exchange 
rate  
channel 
 
Interest rate 
channel 
 
Indirect influ-
ence to NEER 
 
Direct influ-
ence to NEER 
Transmission 
of shocks 
during 
months 
(percentage 
ratio) 
NEER 
shock  
to CPI 
NEER 
shock to 
CPI 
REFR 
shock to 
CPI 
NEER shock  
to REFR 
NEER shock  
to FE 
1st month  
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
0.139001 
1.623695 
1.520634 
 
0.133970 
0.810554 
1.104617 
 
19.65289 
0.511203 
0.004968 
 
0.002969 
0.833423 
0.069752 
 
1.037512 
8.041218 
0.335224 
6th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
0.576418 
0.804810 
0.904606 
 
0.519463 
0.841919 
0.256149 
 
22.23313 
1.606029 
3.889830 
 
0.383286 
0.529248 
0.585732 
 
2.569608 
2.929139 
0.161026 
12th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
0.646043 
0.814934 
0.818558 
 
0.584810 
0.730913 
0.226787 
 
23.17031 
5.190357 
6.783222 
 
0.389023 
0.605059 
0.587263 
 
3.705389 
1.474019 
0.463380 
18th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
0.667559 
0.818631 
0.793302 
 
0.604420 
0.592743 
0.223126 
 
23.39594 
11.52467 
7.835916 
 
0.391783 
0.619296 
7.835916 
 
5.608150 
1.010997 
0.925674 
24th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
0.677801 
0.820391 
0.781546 
 
0.613653 
0.497905 
0.221702 
 
23.50136 
17.01943 
8.330368 
 
0.392550 
0.622658 
8.330368 
 
7.404585 
0.783262 
1.446956 
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Table 2. Monetary transmission channels in the first, second and third subperiod 
in the Czech Republic according to results of variance decomposition of CPI, 
DR/RR, FE to NEER and DR/RR shocks within VAR/VEC model  
 
Exchange 
rate 
channel 
 
Interest rate 
channel 
 
Indirect 
influence to 
NEER 
 
Direct 
influence to 
NEER 
Transmission 
of shocks 
during 
months 
(percentage 
ratio) 
NEER 
shock  
to CPI 
NEER 
shock to 
CPI 
DR/RR 
shock to 
CPI 
NEER shock 
to DR/RR 
NEER shock  
to FE 
1st month 
1st subperiod 
  2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
(1997:12-
2001:01) 
 
2.089344 
0.228753 
2.090504 
(1.317709) 
 
0.553514 
0.877146 
1.719247 
(0.319348) 
 
1.893431 
4.554775 
9.757214 
(19.21934) 
 
13.55431 
7.153304 
1.267797 
(5.143566) 
 
0.552045 
24.49000 
7.173883 
6th month 
1st subperiod 
  2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
(1997:12-
2001:01) 
 
10.92910 
66.72146 
0.766756 
(47.04658) 
 
3.571675 
75.79215 
0.214081 
(18.34143) 
 
11.33322 
6.803735 
15.33864 
(18.90202) 
 
7.667857 
72.77316 
1.632316 
(81.93783) 
 
1.243673 
18.48274 
16.04633 
12th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
(1997:12-
2001:01) 
 
11.51544 
60.11565 
2.066622 
(65.97062) 
 
3.586234 
77.63113 
0.149743 
(19.59105) 
 
11.76606 
14.51875 
18.95154 
(18.47791) 
 
10.65152 
63.69028 
5.209146 
(90.25681) 
 
3.698823 
17.43292 
24.10995 
18th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
11.55872 
53.95582 
3.827606 
 
3.643616 
78.37893 
0.306942 
 
11.87317 
16.26559 
21.55722 
 
13.32705 
61.23576 
8.877681 
 
4.750981 
16.75884 
30.80058 
24th month 
1st subperiod 
2ndsubperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
11.51846 
49.45121 
5.278379 
 
3.682184 
78.27326 
0.538646 
 
11.90097 
17.37055 
23.61042 
 
15.15966 
60.77241 
12.74496 
 
5.271905 
16.32038 
36.35207 
Notes: exchange rate channel"ordering NEER-CPI, responses of CPI; interest rate 
channel"ordering NEER-DR/RR-CPI, responses of CPI; indirect influence to 
NEER"NEER-CPI-DR/RR, responses of DR/RR; direct influence to NEER"NEER-
FE, responses of FE. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
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Table 3. Monetary transmission channels in the first, second and third subperiod 
in Slovakia according to results of variance decomposition of CPI, IR, FE to 
NEER and IR shocks within VAR/VEC model  
 
Notes: exchange rate channel"ordering NEER-CPI, responses of CPI; interest rate chan-
nel"ordering NEER-IR-CPI, responses of CPI; indirect influence to NEER"NEER-CPI-
IR, responses of IR; direct influence to NEER"NEER-FE, responses of FE. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exchange 
rate  
channel 
 
Interest rate 
channel 
 
Indirect influ-
ence to NEER 
 
Direct influ-
ence to NEER 
Transmission 
of shocks 
during 
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0.721297 
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0.438554 
 
0.076878 
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1.660716 
 
0.019710 
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4.238217 
6th month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
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5.113302 
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Table 4. Monetary transmission channels in the first, second and third subperiod 
in the Republic of Serbia according to results of variance decomposition of CPI, 
IROMO, FE to NER and IROMO shocks within VAR/VEC model 
Notes: exchange rate channel"ordering NER-CPI, responses of CPI; interest rate chan-
nel"ordering NER-IROMO-CPI, responses of CPI; indirect influence to NER"NER-CPI-
IROMO, responses of IROMO; direct influence to NER"NER-FE, responses of FE. 
Source: authors’ estimations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 In the case of Serbia, there is not enough observations for the first subperiod to estimate the direct 
influence to an exchange rate. Hence, the first and the second subperiods are estimated together.  
 
Exchange 
rate 
channel 
 
Interest rate 
channel 
 
Indirect 
influence to 
NER 
 
Direct in-
fluence to 
NER 
Transmission 
of shocks 
during 
months 
(percentage 
ratio) 
NER 
shock  
to CPI 
NER 
shock to 
CPI 
IROMO 
shock to 
CPI 
NER shock  
to IROMO 
NER shock  
to FE8 
1st month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
24.59285 
10.32368 
13.68096 
 
23.10192 
10.32947 
27.20191 
 
0.162310 
5.373216 
0.485395 
 
5.626024 
2.785595 
0.096457 
 
- 
2.763060 
15.85959 
6th month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
34.92790 
27.29152 
38.90179 
 
31.14777 
28.37844 
53.67366 
 
2.285137 
4.153149 
3.188154 
 
13.33351 
4.989227 
30.27787 
 
- 
14.63982 
63.38531 
12th month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
35.40627 
31.92454 
39.96571 
 
31.60240 
33.04881 
54.58139 
 
2.128240 
3.651718 
2.874762 
 
13.35143 
4.997893 
32.75575 
 
- 
12.38021 
74.61353 
18th month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
35.46205 
33.30348 
40.30910 
 
31.65716 
34.43824 
54.85765 
 
2.112336 
3.510158 
2.779292 
 
13.35415 
5.017231 
35.37767 
 
- 
20.85426 
7948954 
24th month 
1st subperiod 
2nd subperiod 
3rd subperiod 
 
35.46843 
33.93622 
40.47336 
 
31.66440 
35.07856 
54.99030 
 
2.110287 
3.445157 
2.733485 
 
13.35478 
5.036714 
37.97048 
 
- 
41.05736 
81.91291 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Regimes Changes: The Cases of Poland, Czech Republic... 
 223 
Figure 1.  Exchange rate pass-through to consumer prices in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Serbia in identified subperiods according to results of 
variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model 
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Source: authors’ review. 
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Figure 2.  Interest rate pass-through to consumer prices in Poland, the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Serbia in identified subperiods according to results of 
variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model 
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Source: authors’ review. 
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Figure 3.  Indirect influence to exchange rate fluctuations via interest rate in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Serbia in identified subperiods ac-
cording to results of variance decomposition in VAR/VEC model 
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Figure 4.  Direct influence to exchange rate fluctuations with foreign exchange 
reserves in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Republic of Serbia in 
identified subperiods according to results of variance decomposition in 
VAR/VEC model 
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